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President Bush’s 2005 nominations to the Supreme Courtof the United States intensified the discussion over therole of judges in the American judicial system.  The
majority of that discussion has focused on the rule of law and
how it pertains to the scope of judicial power.  As a nominee
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, now-Chief Justice John
Roberts proclaimed, “It is [the] rule of law that protects the
rights and liberties of all Americans. It is the envy of the world.
Because without the rule of law, any rights are meaningless.”  
Two recently published books, On the Rule of Law: History,
Politics, Theory by Brian Z. Tamanaha, and  The Rule of Law in
America by Ronald A. Cass, provide an in-depth analysis into
what the rule of law means today, its history, and what impact
its meaning has on the current American judiciary.
Tamanaha is quick to point out the uniqueness that exists
when it comes to the idea of the rule of law.  The rule of law as
an ideal has received unprecedented endorsement that no
other single political idea has ever achieved.  Chinese leaders
have supported the establishment of the rule of law in their
own country.  President Bush is frequently quoted as support-
ing “democracy and the rule of law.”  Iranian leaders have
embraced the importance of the rule of law.  Even a former
Afghan warlord, campaigning for a position in the post-Taliban
government, was quoted as saying, “Now is the time to defend
ourselves not with tanks and armed corps but by the rule of
law.”  Similar endorsements can be attributed to many more
political leaders, leaders of governments that seem to have very
little respect for the values, such as individual rights, capital-
ism, and democracy, that are essential to judicial system in the
United States.  
One of the questions that Tamanaha attempts to answer is
what role the judge plays in the rule of law.  In searching for
the answer, Tamanaha writes at great length about the history
of the rule and how it has developed as a concept throughout
the ages.  Tamanaha describes how the rule of law was started
as a vague concept in Greek thought, how nobles used the idea
during the Middle Ages to protect themselves against the
tyranny of the kings, and how numerous political movements
and theorists had influence on what the rule of law means
today.
Of these movements, the classic liberalism movement of the
late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had the greatest
impact on what is understood today to be the rule of law.
Classic liberalism stressed many ideas, such as individual lib-
erty, capitalism, and government based on the consent of the
citizenry.  In terms of the rule of law, however, it was key that
classic liberalism stressed a competitive interdependence
within the government.  With the idea that no single institu-
tion should accumulate total power, liberals saw the division of
government into separate compartments as essential in the
preservation of liberty.  This division of power included creat-
ing a supreme independent judiciary, one that could rein in the
other branches of government when they threatened the lib-
erty of the citizenry.  No single individual was above the law,
every citizen and government actor was accountable to the law.
This model of judicial independence is what today’s American
legal system is built upon.  Many skeptics points out that such
a system does not always protect liberty as it was originally
designed to do, but Tamanaha points out while the system is
not perfect,  “Law is the skeleton that holds the liberal system
upright and gives it form and stability.”
In a classic liberal system, judges were allocated a special
place as the final preservers of the rule of law.  The laws of the
land were seen as being different from morality or politics in
the sense that they were not arbitrary or subject to the passions
of a few, but rather the laws were formed by the consent of the
citizenry, and it was the judge’s role to ensure that those laws
were followed.  It was seen as the judge’s role not to change the
law or interpret it in a manner that best suited his desires.  The
judge was seen as a mere conduit for announcing what the law
required.
The classic liberal ideal of the rule of law began to decline
with the increasing demand for a social welfare state in the end
of the nineteenth century and continuing throughout the late
twentieth century.  One clear downside to the economics of
classic liberalism was that while it fostered an unprecedented
expansion of commercial activity, its rewards were spread
unequally, creating disparity among social classes.  One of the
more glaring inequalities was the working poor toiling long
hours in abominable conditions, and doing so for little pay and
few benefits.  This inequity appeared not only to be harsh but
grossly unfair, as those who benefited the most appeared to
labor the least and therefore be the least deserving.
In response to these inequities, governments began to shed
themselves of their laissez-faire economics and began to
increase the amount of economic regulation and social welfare.
This increase in the United States began in large part as a
response to the Great Depression, and except for intermittent
episodes of deregulation and welfare reform, has continued
into the new millennium.  During this time, the rule of law
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be characterized as belonging to a relatively autonomous
domain of law.  Under this system, a judge is not allowed to do
what he or she thinks is best or what is the most appropriate
according to some principle divorced from positive law, but
instead the judge is directed to find the proper meaning for a
particular law.  The agency model emphasizes that the judge’s
role is fixed irrespective of his or her own individual prefer-
ences. 
Cass analyzes the evidence the supports both models, but
he concludes that most judges do not conform fully to either
polar model.   There are institutional incentives that encourage
judges to follow whichever model they choose to follow.  Most
notably absent, however, are binding constraints that would
prevent judges from injecting personal beliefs into decisions.
The influences that a judge uses in the decision-making
process depends wholly on the particular judge.  While a judge
might face strong criticism for the use of particular influences
(such as international law), in most cases such criticism is the
maximum extent of negative repercussions that a judge would
face.  This is especially true in the federal judiciary, where
judges have lifetime appointment and the threat of impeach-
ment is almost nonexistent.
In conclusion, both books are unable to point to a specific
definition of the rule of law, nor is either able to say precisely
what role a judge plays within that definition.  Perhaps that is
the point, however, as the prevailing theme of both books is
that the definition for the rule of law depends wholly on the
perspective of the definer.  The same can be said for the role of
a judge, as it is a judge’s prerogative to decide exactly what role
to play within the judicial system.  Tamanaha’s and Cass’s
works are excellent tools in grasping the array of approaches to
applying the rule of law in today’s judicial system.
William F. Hurst IV is a student editor for Court Review.  He is a
third-year law student at the University of Kansas School of Law.
come under fire, as it was often viewed as a blockade for many
of the progressive changes that were sought by many during
the twentieth century.  
The role of the judge changed dramatically during this
transformation.  Judges in the social-welfare state were increas-
ingly asked to apply open-ended standards like fairness, good
faith, reasonableness, and unconscionability.  Judges were
often asked to engage in purposive reasoning in order to
achieve legislatively established policy goals.  This change in
the role of the judiciary was seen by some observers as con-
trary to formal rule-of-law principles.  Rather than simply
applying the law as it was written, many judges went outside
the domain of legal rules and legal reasoning to consult exter-
nal sources of knowledge to discern the lay sense of justice.
Many decisions began to be based on political or economic
arguments, rather than the legal arguments that advocates of
the rule of law wished to see.  Observers warned that the rule
of law was being threatened by having unelected judges make
decisions no different in kind from those made by legislatures.
In his book, Cass writes at length about what role a judge
should play in today’s modern understanding of the rule of law.
As one would expect, opinions differ greatly on what that role
should be.  Cass divides the opinions into two camps.  The first
is what Cass calls the partnership model of judging.  This
model describes judges as substantially unconstrained, moti-
vated  by a complex sent of instincts, interest, and incentives.
As Cass points out, judges are seen as partners with other
branches of government, rightly granting substantial room to
choose among several legitimate, alternative decisional paths.
The opposing camp is the agency model of judging, which
finds judges’ decisions primarily governed by external legal
authority.  The judges’ background, politics, and personal pref-
erences do not disappear entirely, but rather are treated as inci-
dental, not dominant factors.  Judges perform their duties
removed from politics, constrained instead by forces that can
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